This paper is devoted to discussing the topological structure of the arrow of time. In the literature, it is often accepted that its algebraic and topological structures are that of a one-dimensional Euclidean space \, although a critical review on the subject is not easy to be found. Hence, leveraging on an operational approach, we collect evidences to identify it structurally as a normed vector space \\), and take a leap of abstraction to complete it, up to isometries, to the (...) real line. During the development of the paper, the space-time is recognized as a fibration, with the fibers being the sets of simultaneous events. The corresponding topology is also exposed: open sets naturally arise within our construction, showing that the classical space-time is non-Hausdorff. The transition from relativistic to classical regimes is explored too. (shrink)

BackgroundCommunity Advisory Boards (CAB) have become essential organs of involving communities in HIV clinical trials especially in developing countries. However, limited empirical evidence exists on the role of CABs in low and middle-income countries including Tanzania. This study aims at exploring the role of CABs in community-based HIV clinical trials conducted in Tanzania.MethodologyWe adopted a phenomenological approach to purposefully select HIV clinical trial stakeholders. These included CAB members, researchers and Institutional Review Board (IRB) members in Tanzania. We conducted In-depth Interviews (...) (IDIs) with ten participants and three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with eighteen participants. The data were thematically analyzed with the aid of MAXQDA software version 20.2.1.ResultsThe findings indicate that at every stage of implementation of a community-based HIV clinical trial, a functioning CAB is important for its success. This importance is based on contextualization of the informed consent process and protocol, managing rumours in the community, weighing trial risks and benefits, sensitizing the community, assisting participant recruitment, tracing and retention. However, being perceived as financial beneficiaries than community representatives emerged as a challenge to CAB members. ConclusionThe study empirically indicates the need for functioning CABs in every stage of implementation of community-based HIV clinical trials. The roles of which are interwoven in serving research goals and protecting the interests of the community and that of trial participants. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In all cases, the problem concerns the proper meaning of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals. For present purposes, a conditional sentence is one composed of at least two clauses, the central connective of which is, or is understood to be, "if... then." A subjunctive conditional is a conditional sentence in which the clause following the "if," the antecedent, may be true or false, but in which the truth or falsity of the entire sentence does not depend upon the truth or falsity (...) of its two clauses, the antecedent and consequent. A contrary-to-fact conditional, or counterfactual sentence, is a subjunctive conditional sentence which implicitly asserts that the antecedent is false. An example of the subjunctive conditional is. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 389 From the perspective of this reviewer, the presently most obvious fault in this lecture lies in Putnam's criticisms of "the coherence theorists, Ludwig, et al." (p. 97). In this criticism, it is apparently assumed that the adequacy of their proposed solution to the problem considered must be judged solely on the basis of what is presently known. Since Putnam himself acknowledges that no satisfactory interpretation of (...) quantum mechanics exists, this seems unwarranted. The superficiality of the criticism of this position makes this particularly notable. He states, for example, "to say that a wave gives an incomplete description of the state of a system is to say that systems whose state can be described by that wave function may really be in several quite different physical conditions." He then adopts the doubtful strategy of appealing to the meaning of completeness and incompleteness (they are not a matter of degree) in justification of the position that it is improper to say that a wave gives an incomplete descriptionl Despite the fact that, taken as a whole, his brief criticism of the coherence theory is somewhat ungracious. Putnam has set forth the principle issues sur~ rounding the problem with discerning lucidity. Paul K. Feyerabend, in "Problems of Empiricism," places a revisionist's version of empiricism in a carefully developed historical perspective. Empiricism as it has been known is both incomplete and weakened by undesirable assumptions. The incompleteness is to be removed by regarding empiricism as a cosmological hypothesis concerning the relation between man and the universe. The version of empiricism thus admitted has the character of a scientific theory. The undesirable assumptions are views no longer tenable of the nature and content of what is given in sense. Feyerbend understands sensations and perceptions as indicators on a par with indications of physical instruments, and likewise in need of interpretation. A philosophical method is proposed which requires theoretical pluralism instead of the theoretical monism that is (inappropriately) the ideal of much of contemporary empiricism (p. 149). The function of theoretical alternatives is to provide the means of criticizing accepted theory, to which he accords careful historical treatment. "Low level theories" are to guide us to crucial experiments, while "high level theories" are to represent the basic element of the universe. Here again the reader will find a theme which emerges erpeatedly in these lectures. This theme might be stated as follows. Both macrocosmic and microcosmic systems must ultimately be involved in scientific explanation. The crucial problem that emerges is how these two are to be related or in some degree integrated. By the way in which he develops the role of alternative theories, Feyerabend has affirmed one of the principle theoretical components of what Hegel was minded to call metaphysics. An additional observation, for which what I have said should furnish some justification: Many points made throughout this exposition (115 pp. in length) might properly be regarded as together constituting a rapprochement of empiricism and rationalism. It may very well occur to the thoughtful reader that Feyerabend, in his reconstruction of empiricism, has come very near to conceding all that a critical rationalist could ask. Other lectures included in the book are, "The Thermodynamics of Purpose," by David Hawkins, "The Physics of the Large," by Philip Morrison, and "The Ethical Dimension of Scientific Research," by Nicholas Rescher. In the last-mentioned lecture, Professor Rescher points up some generally little understood ethical problems confronted by the scientist in the practice of his profession. DARREL E. CICIRISTENSEN Wo]lord College BOOK NOTES Colin Cherry, On Human Communications: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. Pp. xiv + 337. (This is an unabridged and unaltered edition of the work first published by the M.I.T. Press in 1957.) $10.00. "In preparation of the current volume, I have examined the original carefully and have decided not to withdraw from anything said there, but merely to add some comments, to up- 390 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY date some figures, and to extend the bibliography.... Since detailed reference is impossible, I have decided to restrict the new Bibliography to useful sources of reference, a few of the more significant... (shrink)

Gregory Bateson is well known for defining information by stating “In fact what we mean by information – the elementary unit of information – is a difference which makes a difference…” This conceptual perspective has the merit of simplicity and generality. Simplicity, in addressing the complexity of information. Generality, in seeking applicability to any and every field of human experience. The purpose of this paper is to focus the applicability of this conceptual approach by Bateson and use it to perform (...) a calculation of taking the difference between two grey-level digital images that are shifted one relative to the other. The digital images take the place of the field of view that a human being would have access through her sense of vision at two different spatial/temporal instances. The results show that it is possible to highlight the edges of the objects under scrutiny, as well as to highlight other differences within the object. Bateson’s “difference that makes a difference” would seem to provide a first step in the elusive meaning making process of humans. (shrink)

English summary: Schelling's Die Weltalter was frequently announced as ready for publication, but little of the book was ever written. Schelling planned Die Weltalter as a volume in three parts, describing the past, present, and future of the world; however, he began only the first part, rewriting it several times and at last keeping it unpublished. The other two parts were left only in planning. French text.French description: « Commencé seulement les Ages du monde ». Cette note que Schelling consigne (...) dans son Tagebuch à la date du 27 décembre 1810 donne le coup d'envoi d'un des projets les plus grandioses qu'un philosophe se soit proposé, retracer sur la base de concepts philosophiques les étapes de la vie divine et de la création. S'il est vrai, comme le disait Novalis, que « vouloir écrire une Bible est un penchant à la folie que tout homme doit avoir pour être complet », cette grande fresque cosmique et théologique représente la tentative la plus magistrale qu'ait menée l'idéalisme allemand pour rendre compte de la totalité de la manifestation divine et en proposer une présentation effective et complète. Or, dans la dernière version de l'ouvrage, celle-là même que Schelling fit introduire dans ses Sammtliche Werke et dont nous donnons ici une nouvelle traduction dans la continuité de celle des brouillons de 1811 et 1813, le récit et la construction spéculative cherchent encore à atteindre un point d'équilibre. Un double effort pour implanter la succession au coeur même de l'Absolu tout en équilibrant en Dieu les rapports de l'idéal et du réel prépare l'avènement d'une philosophie historique sans ue l'on débouche jamais tout à fait sur une hétérogénéité radicale de l'être et du penser. Ainsi, à travers cette description du passé le plus archaïque, Schelling met pour la première fois effectivement la philosophie en possession de ce qu'elle recherche depuis toujours : « la science, c'est-à-dire l'histoire ». (shrink)

Problem: Visions of technology, future scenarios, guiding visions represent imaginations of future states of affairs that play a functional role in processes of technological research, development and innovation—e.g. as a means to create attention, communication, coordination, or for the strategic exertion of influence. Since a couple of years there is a growing attention for such imaginations of futures in politics, the economy, research and the civil society. This trend concerns technology assessment as an observer of these processes and a consultant (...) on the implications of technology and innovation. TA faces increasing demands to assess imaginations of futures that circulate in the present and to participate in shaping these through scenarios or foresights. More than ever, this raises the question, which propositions can be made based on these imaginations by TA and how this can be used in advisory practices. Imaginations of futures are relevant for TA not as predictions but in their significance and effectiveness in the present, which need to be understood and assessed.Contents: This discussion paper outlines how present significance and effects of imagined futures in technological research and innovation processes can be conceived and analyzed. In this paper, all forms of imaginations of technology futures will be called “socio-technical futures” because within them technological developments and social changes are interwoven and inseparably interrelated. In this paper, we discuss why TA should analyze socio-technical futures, how such analyses can grasp the societal conditions that are expressed in the imagined futures and how these become effective in processes of technology development, communication, decision making etc. We raise the question which self-reflexive positioning or possible realignment of TA is needed as a response to its increased concern with assessing and even co-producing socio-technical futures. The latter is often demanded regarding the growing attention by politics and publics to imaginations of futures with wide temporal and spatial reach.Addressee of this paper is the TA community in a broader sense. The aim is to sensitize colleagues for the topic and its challenges, to consolidate discussions and to provide theoretical and methodical suggestions for research in TA and related advisory practices with respect to socio-technical futures. This paper has been originally initiated during the workshop “The present of technological futures-theoretical and methodical challenges for Technology Assessment”, in which all of the paper’s authors participated. The contents of this discussion paper are preliminary results that shall initiate and guide further discussions. (shrink)